Directions in Abusive Language Training Data: Garbage In, Garbage Out by Vidgen, Bertie & Derczynski, Leon
Directions in Abusive Language Training Data
Garbage In, Garbage Out
BERTIE VIDGEN, The Alan Turing Institute
LEON DERCZYNSKI, IT University of Copenhagen
Data-driven analysis and detection of abusive online content covers many different tasks, phenomena, contexts,
and methodologies. This paper systematically reviews abusive language dataset creation and content in
conjunction with an open website for cataloguing abusive language data. This collection of knowledge leads
to a synthesis providing evidence-based recommendations for practitioners working with this complex and
highly diverse data.
1 INTRODUCTION
Abusive online content, such as hate speech and harassment, has received substantial attention over
the past few years for its malign social effects. Left unchallenged, abusive content risks harminng
those who are targeted, toxifying public discourse, exacerbating social tensions and could lead to
the exclusion of some groups from public spaces. As such, systems which can accurately detect and
classify online abuse at scale, in real-time and without bias are of central interest to tech companies,
policymakers and academics.
Most detection systems rely on having the right training dataset, reflecting one of the most widely
accepted mantras in computer science: Garbage In, Garbage Out. Put simply: to have systems which
can detect and classify abusive online content effectively, one needs appropriate datasets with which
to train them. However, creating training datasets is often a laborious and non-trivial task – and
creating datasets which are non-biased, large and theoretically-informed is even more difficult ([71]
p. 189). We address this issue by examining and reviewing publicly available datasets for abusive
content detection, which we provide access to on a new dedicated website, hatespeechdata.com.
In the first section, we examine previous reviews and present the four research aims which
guide this paper. In the second section, we conduct a critical and in-depth analysis of the available
datasets, discussing first what their aim is, how tasks have been described and what taxonomies
have been constructed and then, second, what they contain and how they were annotated. In the
third section, we discuss the challenges of open science in this research area and elaborates different
ways of sharing training datasets, including the website hatespeechdata.com In the final section,
we draw on our findings to establish best practices when creating datasets for abusive content
detection.
2 BACKGROUND
The volume of research examining the social and computational aspects of abusive content detection
has expanded prodigiously in the past five years. This has been driven by growing awareness of the
importance of the Internet more broadly [72], greater recognition of the harms caused by online
abuse [114], and policy and regulatory developments, such as the EU’s Code of Conduct on Hate,
the UK Government’s ‘Online Harms’ white paper [56], Germany’s NetzDG laws, the Public Pledge
on Self-Discipline for the Chinese Internet Industry, and France’s anti-hate regulation [114]. In
2020 alone, three computer science venues will host workshops on online hate (TRAC and STOC
at LREC, and WOAH at EMNLP), and a shared task at 2019’s SemEval on online abuse detection
reports that 800 teams downloaded the training data and 115 submitted detection systems [119]. At
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the same time, social scientific interventions have also appeared, deepening our understanding of
how online abuse spreads [115] and how its harmful impact can be mitigated and challenged [102].
All analyses of online abuse ultimately rely on a way of measuring it, which increasingly means
having a method which can handle the sheer volume of content produced, shared and engaged with
online. Traditional qualitative methods cannot scale to handle the hundreds of millions of posts
which appear on each major social media platform every day, and can also introduce inconsistencies
and biase [52]. Computational tools have emerged as the most promising way of classifying and
detecting online abuse, drawing on work in machine learning, Natural Language Processing (NLP)
and statistical modelling. Increasingly sophisticated architectures, features and processes have
been used to detect and classify online abuse, leveraging technically sophisticated methods, such
as contextual word embeddings, graph embeddings and dependency parsing. Despite their many
differences [95], nearly all methods of online abuse detection rely on a training dataset, which is
used to teach the system what is and is not abuse. However, there is a lacuna of research on this
crucial aspect of the machine learning process. Indeed, although several general reviews of the
field have been conducted, no previous research has reviewed training datasets for abusive content
detection in sufficient breadth or depth. This is surprising given (i) their fundamental importance
in the detection of online abuse and (ii) growing awareness that several existing datasets suffer
from many flaws [29, 47]. Close relevant work includes:
• Schmidt and Wiegand conduct a comprehensive review of research into the detection and
classification of abusive online content. They discuss training datasets, stating that ‘to perform
experiments on hate speech detection, access to labelled corpora is essential’ ([95], p. 7),
and briefly discuss the sources and size of the most prominent existing training datasets, as
well as how datasets are sampled and annotated. Schmidt and Wiegand identify two key
challenges with existing datasets. First, ‘data sparsity’: many training datasets are small and
lack linguistic variety. Second, metadata (such as how data was sampled) is crucial as it lets
future researchers understand unintended biases, but is often not adequately reported ([95],
p. 6).
• Waseem et al.[110] outline a typology of detection tasks, based on a two-by-two matrix of (i)
identity- versus person- directed abuse and (ii) explicit versus implicit abuse. They emphasise
the importance of high-quality datasets, particularly for more nuanced expressions of abuse:
‘Without high quality labelled data to learn these representations, it may be difficult for
researchers to come up with models of syntactic structure that can help to identify implicit
abuse.’ ([110], p. 81)
• Jurgens et al.[63] discuss also conduct a critical review of hate speech detection, and note that
‘labelled ground truth data for building and evaluating classifiers is hard to obtain because
platforms typically do not share moderated content due to privacy, ethical and public relations
concerns.’ ([63], p. 3661) They argue that the field needs to ‘address the data scarcity faced by
abuse detection research’ in order to better address more complex rsearch issues and pressing
social challenges, such as ‘develop[ing] proactive technologies that counter or inhibit abuse
before it harms’ ([63], pp. 3658, 3661).
• Vidgen et al. describe several limitations with existing training datasets for abusive content,
most noticeably how ‘they contain systematic biases towards certain types and targets of
abuse.’ [106][p.2]. They describe three issues in the quality of datasets: degradation (whereby
datasets decline in quality over time), annotation (whereby annotators often have low agree-
ment, indicating considerable uncertainty in class assignments) and variety (whereby ‘The
quality, size and class balance of datasets varies considerably.’ [p. 6]).
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• Chetty and Alathur[24] review the use of Internet-based technologies and online social
networks to study the spread of hateful, offensive and extremist content [24]. Their review
covers both computational and legal/social scientific aspects of hate speech detection, and
outlines the importance of distinguishing between different types of group-directed prejudice.
However, they do not consider training datasets in any depth.
• Fortuna and Nunes[44] provide an end-to-end review of hate speech research, including
the motivations for studying online hate, definitional challenges, dataset creation/sharing,
and technical advances, both in terms of feature selection and algorithmic architecture ([44],
2018). They delineate between different types of online abuse, including hate, cyberbullying,
discrimination and flaming, and add much needed clarity to the field. They show that (1)
dataset size varies considerably but they are generally small (mostly containing fewer than
10,000 entries), (2) Twitter is the most widely-studied platform, and (3) most papers research
hate speech per se (i.e. without specifying a target). Of those which do specify a target, racism
and sexism are the most researched. However, their review focuses on publications rather
than datasets: the same dataset might be used in multiple studies, limiting the relevance of
their review for understanding the intrinsic role of training datasets. They also only engage
with datasets fairly briefly, as part of a much broader review.
• Several classification papers also discuss the most widely used datasets, including Davidson
et al. [30] who describe five datasets, and Salminen et al. who review 17 datasets and describe
four in detail [92].
This paper addresses this lacuna in existing research, providing a systematic review of avail-
able training datasets for online abuse. To provide structure to this review, we adopt the ‘data
statements’ framework put forward by Bender and Friedman [9], as well as other work providing
frameworks, schema and processes for analysing NLP artefacts [15, 91, 98]. Data statements are a
way of documenting the decisions which underpin the creation of datasets used for Natural Lan-
guage Processing (NLP). They formalise how decisions should be documented, not only ensuring
scientific integrity but also addressing ‘the open and urgent question of how we integrate ethical
considerations in the everyday practice of our field’ ([9], p. 587). In many cases, we find that it is
not possible to fully recreate the level of detail recorded in an original data statement from how
datasets are described in publications. This reinforces the importance of proper documentation at
the point of dataset creation.
As the field of online abusive content detection matures, it has started to tackle more complex
research challenges, such as multi-platform, multi-lingual and multi-target abuse detection, and
systems are increasingly being deployed in ‘the wild’ for social scientific analyses and for content
moderation [115]. Such research heightens the focus on training datasets as exactly what is being
detected comes under greater scrutiny. To enhance our understanding of this domain, our review
paper has four research aims.
(1) Research Aim One: to provide an in-depth and critical analysis of the available training
datasets for abusive online content detection.
(2) Research Aim Two: to map and discuss ways of addressing the lack of dataset sharing, and as
such the lack of ‘open science’, in the field of online abuse research.
(3) Research Aim Three: to introduce the website hatespeechdata.com, as a way of enabling
more dataset sharing.
(4) Research Aim Four : to identify best practices for creating an abusive content training dataset.
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Fig. 1. Year in which training datasets were originally published
3 ANALYSIS OF TRAINING DATASETS
Relevant publications have been identified from four sources to identify training datasets for abusive
content detection:
(1) The Scopus database of academic publications, identified using keyword searches.1
(2) The ACL Anthology database of NLP research papers, identified using keyword searches.
(3) The ArXiv database of preprints, identified using keyword searches.
(4) Proceedings of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd workshops on abusive language online (ACL).
Most publications report on the creation of one abusive content training dataset. However, some
describe several new datasets simultaneously or provide one dataset with several distinct subsets of
data [18, 39, 69, 83]. For consistency, we separate out each subset of data where they are in different
languages or the data is collected from different platforms. As such, the number of datasets is
greater than the number publications. All of the datasets were released between 2016 and 2019, as
shown in Figure 1.
3.1 The purpose of training datasets
3.1.1 Problems addressed by datasets. Creating a training dataset for online abuse detection is
typically motivated by the desire to address a particular social problem. These motivations can
inform how a taxonomy of abusive language is designed, how data is collected and what instructions
are given to annotators. We identify the following motivating reasons, which were explicitly
referenced by dataset creators.
(1) Reducing harm: Aggressive, derogatory and demeaning online interactions can inflict harm
on individuals who are targeted by such content and those who are not targeted but still
observe it. This has been shown to have profound long-term consequences on individuals’
well-being, with some vulnerable individuals expressing concerns about leaving their homes
following experiences of abuse [6]. Accordingly, many dataset creators state that aggressive
language and online harassment is a social problem which they want to help address
(2) Removing illegal content: Many countries legislate against certain forms of speech, e.g. direct
threats of violence. For instance, the EU’s Code of Conduct requires that all content that
1The keyword searches for the first three sources are available in our appendix.
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is flagged for being illegal online hate speech is reviewed within 24 hours, and removed if
necessary [41]. Many large social media platforms and tech companies adhere to this code of
conduct (including Facebook, Google and Twitter) and, as of September 2019, 89% of such
content is reviewed in 24 hours [38]. However, we note that in most cases the abuse that is
marked up in training datasets falls short of the requirements of illegal online hate – indeed,
as most datasets are taken from public API access points, the data has usually already been
moderated by the platforms and most illegal content removed.
(3) Improving health of online conversations: The health of online communities can be severely
affected by abusive language. It can fracture communities, exacerbate tensions and even
repel users. This is not only bad for the community and for civic discourse in general, it
also negatively impacts engagement and thus the revenue of the host platforms. Therefore,
there is a growing impetus to improve user experience and ensure online dialogues are
healthy, inclusive and respectful where possible. There is ample scope for improvement:
a study showed that 82% of personal attacks on Wikipedia against other editors are not
addressed [117]. Taking steps to improve the health of exchanges in online communities will
also benefit commercial and voluntary content moderators. They are routinely exposed to
such content, often with insufficient safeugards, and sometimes display symptoms similar to
those of PTSD [81]. Automatic tools could help to lessen this exposure, reducing the burden
on moderators.
3.1.2 Uses of datasets: How detection tasks are defined. Myriad tasks have been addressed in the field
of abusive online content detection, reflecting the different disciplines, motivations and assumptions
behind research. This has led to considerable variation in what is actually detected under the
rubric of ‘abusive content’, and establishing a degree of order over the diverse categorisations
and subcategorisations is both difficult and somewhat arbitrary. Key dimensions which dataset
creators have used to categorise detection tasks include who/what is targeted (e.g. groups vs.
individuals), the strength of content (e.g. covert vs. overt), the nature of the abuse (e.g. benevolent
vs. hostile sexism [49]), how the abuse manifests (e.g. threats vs. derogatory statements), the tone
(e.g. aggressive vs. non-aggressive), the specific target (e.g. ethnic minorities vs. women),and the
subjective perception of the reader (e.g. disrespectful vs. respectful). Other important dimensions
include the theme used to express abuse (e.g. Islamophobia which relies on tropes about terrorism
vs. tropes about sexism) and the use of particular linguistic devices, such as appeals to authority,
sincerity and irony. All of these dimensions can be combined in different ways, producing a large
number of intersecting tasks.
Consistency in how tasks are described will not necessarily ensure that datasets can be used
interchangeably. From the description of a task, an annotation framework must be developed which
converts the conceptualisation of abuse into a set of standards. This formalised representation of the
‘abuse’ inevitably involves shortcuts, imperfect rules and simplifications. If annotation frameworks
are developed and applied differently, then even datasets aimed at the same task can still vary
considerably. Nonetheless, how detection tasks for online abuse are described is crucial for how
the datasets – and in turn the systems trained on them – can subsequently be used. For example, a
dataset annotated for hate speech can be used to examine bigoted biases, but the reverse is not true.
How datasets are framed also impacts whether, and how, datasets can be combined to form large
‘mega-datasets’ – a potentially promising avenue for overcoming data sparsity [92].
In the remainder of this section, we provide a framework for splitting out detection tasks along
the two most salient dimensions: (1) the nature of abuse and (2) the granularity of the taxonomy.
Detection tasks: the nature of abuse. This refers to what is targeted/attacked by the content and,
subsequently, how the taxonomy has been designed/framed by the dataset creators. The most
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well-established taxonomic distinction in this regard is the difference between (i) the detection
of interpersonal abuse, and (ii) the detection of group-directed abuse [110]). Other authors have
sought to deductively theorise additional categories, such as ‘concept-directed’ abuse, although
these have not been widely adopted [106]. Through an inductive investigation of existing training
datasets, we extend this binary distinction to four primary categories of abuse which have been
studied in previous work, as well as a fifth ‘Mixed’ category.
(1) Person-directed abuse. Content which directs negativity against individuals, typically through
aggression, insults, intimidation, hostility and trolling, amongst other tactics. Most research
falls under the auspices of ‘cyber bullying’, ‘harassment’ and ‘trolling’ [39, 87, 101]. One
major dataset of English Wikipedia editor comments [117] focuses on the ‘personal attack’
element of harassment, drawing on prior investigations that mapped out harassment in that
community. Another widely used dataset focuses on trolls’ intent to intimidate, distinguishing
between direct harassment and other behaviours [50]. An important consideration in studies
of person-directed abuse is (a) interpersonal relations, such as whether individuals engage
in patterns of abuse or one-off acts and whether they are known to each other in the ‘real’
world (both of which are a key concern in studies of cyberbullying) and (b) standpoint, such
as whether individuals directly engage in abuse themselves or encourage others to do so. For
example, the theoretically sophisticated synthetic dataset provided by [101] identifies not
only harassment but also encouragement to harassment. [18] mark up posts from computer
game forums (World of Warcraft and League of Legends) for cyberbullying and annotate
these as ⟨offender, victim, message⟩ tuples.
(2) Group-directed abuse. Content which directs negativity against a social identity, which is
defined in relation to a particular attribute (e.g. ethnic, racial, religious groups)[60]. Such
abuse is often directed against marginalised or under-represented groups in society. Group-
directed abuse is typically described as ‘hate speech’ and includes use of dehumanising
language, making derogatory, demonising or hostile statements, making threats, and inciting
others to engage in violence, amongst other dangerous communications. Common examples
of group-directed abuse include sexism, which is included in datasets provided by [32, 43, 62,
101, 111] and racism, which is directly targeted in [99, 111]. In some cases, specific types of
group-directed abuse are subsumed within a broader category of identity-directed abuse, as
in [4, 78, 119]. Determining the limits of any group-directed abuse category requires careful
theoretical reflection, as with the decision to include ethnic, caste-based and certain religious
prejudices under ‘racism’. There is no ‘right’ answer to such questions as they engage with
ontological concerns about identification and ‘being’ and the politics of categorization.
(3) Flagged content. Content which is reported by community members or assessed by community
and professional content moderators. This covers a broad range of focuses as moderators
may also remove spam, sexually inappropriate content and other undesirable contributions.
In this regard, ‘flagged’ content is akin to the concept of ‘trolling’, which covers a wide range
of behaviours, from jokes and playful interventions through to sinister personal attacks
such as doxxing [21]. Some forms of trolling can be measured with tools such as the Global
Assessment of Internet Trolling (GAIT) [21].
(4) Incivility. Content which is considered to be incivil, rude, inappropriate, offensive or disre-
spectful [46, 69, 83]. Such categories are usually defined with reference to the tone that the
author adopts rather than the substantive content of what they express, which is the basis
of person- and group- directed categories. Such content usually contains obscene, profane
or otherwise ‘dirty’ words. This can be easier to detect as closed-class lists are effective at
identifying single objectionable words (e.g. [61]). However, one concern with this type of
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research is that the presence of ‘dirty’ words does not necessarily signal malicious intent
or abuse; they may equally be used as intensifiers or colloquialisms [70]. At the same time,
detecting incivility can be more difficult as it requires annotators to infer the subjective intent
of the speaker or to understand (or guess) the social norms of a setting and thus whether
disrespect has been expressed [4]. Content can be incivil without directing hate against a
group or person, and can be inappropriate in one setting but not another: as such it tends to
be more subjective and contextual than other types of abusive language.
(5) Mixed. Content which contains multiple types of abuse, usually a combination of the four
categories discussed above. The intersecting nature of online language means that this is
common but can also manifest in unexpected ways. For instance, female politicians may
receive more interpersonal abuse than other politicians. This might not appear as misogyny
because their identity as women is not referenced – but it might have motivated the abuse
they were subjected to. Mixed forms of abuse require further research, and have thus far
been most fully explored in the OLID dataset provided by [119], who explore several facets
of abuse under one taxonomy.
Detection tasks: Granularity of taxonomies. This refers to how much detail a taxonomy contains,
reflected in the number of unique classes. The most important and widespread distinction is whether
a binary class is used (e.g. Hate / Not) or a multi-level class, such as a tripartite split (typically,
Overt, Covert and Non-abusive). In some cases, a large number of complex classes are created, such
as by combining whether the abuse is targeted or not along with its theme and strength.
In general, Social scientific analyses encourage creating a detailed taxonomy with a large number
of fine-grained categories. However, this is only useful for machine learning if there are enough
data points in each category and if annotators are capable of consistently distinguishing between
them. Complex annotation schemas may not result in better training datasets if they are not
implemented in a robust way. As such, it is unsurprising that binary classification schemas are
the most prevalent, even though they are arguably the least useful given the variety of ways in
which abuse can be articulated. This can range from the explicit and overt (e.g. directing threats
against a group) to more subtle behaviours, such as micro-aggressions and dismissing marginalised
groups’ experiences of prejudice. Subsuming both types of behaviour within one category not only
risks making detection difficult (due to considerable in-class variation) but also leads to a detection
system which cannot make important distinctions between qualitatively different types of content.
This has severe implications for whether detection systems trained on such datasets can actually
be used for downstream tasks, such as content moderation and social scientific analysis.
Drawing together the nature and granularity of abuse, our analyses identify a hierarchy of
taxonomic granularity from least to most granular:
(1) Binary classification of a single ‘meta’ category, such as hate/not or abuse/not. This can lead
to very general and vague research, which is difficult to apply in practice.
(2) Binary classification of a single type of abuse, such as person-directed or group-directed.
This can be problematic given that abuse is nearly always directed against a group rather
than ‘groups’ per se.
(3) Binary classification of abuse against a single well-defined group, such as racism/not or
Islamophobia/not, or interpersonal abuse against a well-defined cohort, such as MPs and
young people.
(4) Multi-class (or multi-label) classification of different types of abuse, such as:
(a) Multiple targets (e.g. racist, sexist and non-hateful content) or
(b) Multiple strengths (e.g. none, implicit and explicit content).
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Fig. 2. Primary language of dataset
(c) Multiple types (e.g. threats versus derogatory statements or benevolent versus hostile
statements).
(5) Multi-class classification of different types of abuse which is integrated with other dimensions
of abuse.
3.2 The content of training datasets
3.2.1 The ‘Level’ of content. 49 of the training datasets are annotated at the level of the post, one
dataset is annotated at the level of the user [88], and none of them are annotated at the level of
the comment thread. Only two publications indicate that the entire conversational thread was
presented to annotators when marking up individual entries, meaning that in most cases this
important contextual information is not used. 49 of the training datasets contain only text. This
is a considerable limitation of existing research [106], especially given the multimodal nature
of online communication and the increasing ubiquity of digital-specific image-based forms of
communication such as Memes, Gifs, Filters and Snaps [20]. Although some work has addressed
the task of detecting hateful images [118, 121], this lead to the creation of a publically available
labelled training dataset in only one case [51]. To our knowledge, no research has tackled the
problem of detecting hateful audio content. This is a distinct challenge; alongside the semantic
content audio also contains important vocal cues which provide more opportunities to investigate
(but also potentially misinterpret) tone and intention.
3.2.2 Language. The most common language in the training datasets is English, which appears in
20 datasets, followed by Arabic and Italian (5 datasets each), Hindi-English (4 datasets) and then
German, Indonesian and Spanish (3 datasets). Noticeably, several major languages, both globally
and in Europe, do not appear, which suggests considerable unevenness in the linguistic and cultural
focuses of abusive language detection. For instance, there aremajor gaps in the coverage of European
languages, including Danish and Dutch. Surprisingly, French only appears once. The dominance of
English may be due to how we sampled publications (for which we used English terms), but may
also reflect different publishing practices in different countries and how well-developed abusive
content research is.
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Fig. 3. Platform from which data is gathered
3.2.3 Source of data. Training datasets use data collected from a range of online spaces, including
from mainstream platforms, such as Twitter, Wikipedia and Facebook, to more niche forums, such
as World of Warcraft and Stormfront. In most cases, data is collected from public sources and then
manually annotated but in others data is sourced through proprietary data sharing agreements
with host platforms. Unsurprisingly, Twitter is the most widely used source of data, accounting
for 27 of the datasets. This reflects wider concerns in computational social research that Twitter is
over-used, primarily because it has a very accessible API for data collection [27, 76]. Facebook and
Wikipedia are the second most used sources of data, accounting for three datasets each – although
we note that all three Wikipedia datasets are reported in the same publication. Many of the most
widely used online platforms are not represented at all, or only in one dataset, such as Reddit,
Weibo, VK and YouTube.
The lack of diversity in where data is collected from limits the development of detection systems.
Three main issues emerge:
(1) Linguistic practices vary across platforms. Twitter only allows 280 characters (previously
only 140), provoking stylistic changes [57], and abusive content detection systems trained on
this data are unlikely to work as well with longer pieces of text. Dealing with longer pieces
of text could necessitate different classification systems, potentially affecting the choice of
algorithmic architecture. Additionally, the technical affordances of platforms may affect the
style, tone and topic of the content they host.
(2) The demographics of users on different platforms vary considerably. Social science research
indicates that ‘digital divides’ exist, whereby online users are not representative of wider
populations and differ across different online spaces [12, 76, 105]. Blank draws attention to
how Twitter users are usually younger and wealthier than offline populations; over reliance
on data from Twitter means, in effect, that we are over-sampling data from this privileged
section of society. Blank also shows that there are also important cross-national differences:
British Twitters are better-educated than the offline British population but the same is not
true for American Twitter users compared with the offline American population [12]. These
demographic differences are likely to affect the types of content that users produce.
(3) Platforms have different norms and so host different types and amounts of abuse. Mainstream
platforms have made efforts in recent times to ‘clean up’ content and so the most overt and
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Fig. 4. Distribution of dataset sizes
aggressive forms of abuse, such as direct threats, are likely to be taken down [48]. However,
more niche platforms, such as Gab or 4chan, tolerate more offensive forms of speech and are
more likely to contain explicit abuse, such as racism and very intrusive forms of harassment,
such as ‘doxxing’ [55, 73, 120]. Over-reliance on a few sources of data could mean that
datasets are biased towards only a subset of types of abuse.
3.2.4 Size. The size of the training datasets varies considerably from 469 posts to 17 million;
a difference of four orders of magnitude. Differences in size partly reflect different annotation
approaches. The largest datasets are from proprietary data sharing agreements with platforms.
Smaller datasets tend to be carefully collected and thenmanually annotated. There are no established
guidelines for how large an abusive language training dataset needs to be. However, smaller datasets
are problematic because they contain too little linguistic variation and increase the likelihood of
overfitting. Rizoiu et al.[89] train detection models on only a proportion of the Davidson et al. and
Waseem training datasets and show that this leads to worse performance, with a lower F1-Score,
particularly for ‘data hungry’ deep learning approaches [89]. At the same time, ‘big’ datasets alone
are not a panacea for the challenges of abusive content classification. Large training datasets which
have been poorly sampled, annotated with theoretically problematic categories or inexpertly and
unthoughtfully annotated, could still lead to the development of poor classification systems.
The challenges posed by small datasets could potentially be overcome through machine learning
techniques such as ‘semi-supervised’ and ‘active’ learning [66], although these have only been
limitedly applied to abusive content detection so far [65]. Sharifirad et al. propose using text
augmentation and new text generation as a way of overcoming small datasets, which is a promising
avenue for future research [96].
3.2.5 Class distribution and sampling. Class distribution is an important, although often under-
considered, aspect of the design of training datasets. Datasets with little abusive content will lack
linguistic variation in terms of what is abusive, thereby increasing the risk of overfitting. More
concerningly, the class distribution directly affects the nature of the engineering task and how
performance should be evaluated. For instance, if a dataset is 70% hate speech then a zero-rule
classification system (i.e. where everything is categorised as hate speech) will achieve 70% precision
and 100% recall. This should be used as a baseline for evaluating performance: 80% precision is less
impressive compared with this baseline. However, 80% precision on an evenly balanced dataset
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Directions in Abusive Language Training Data 11
Fig. 5. Relative size of “abusive" data class
would be impressive. This is particularly important when evaluating the performance of ternary
classifiers, when classes can be considerably imbalanced.
On average, 35% of the content in the training datasets is abusive.2 However, class distributions
vary considerably, from those with just 1% abusive content up to 100%. These differences are largely
a product of how data is sampled and which platform it is taken from. Bretschneider [18] created
two datasets without using purposive sampling, and as such they contain very low levels of abuse
( 1%). Other studies filter data collection based on platforms, time periods, keywords/hashtags and
individuals to increase the prevalence of abuse. Four datasets comprise only abusive content; three
cases are synthetic datasets, reported on in one publication [26], and in the other case the dataset
is an amendment to an existing dataset and only contains misogynistic content [62].
Purposive sampling has been criticised for introducing various forms of bias into datasets [112],
such as missing out on mis-spelled content [36] and only focusing on the linguistic patterns of an
atypical subset of users. One pressing risk is that a lot of data is sampled from far right communities
– which means that most hate speech classifiers implicitly pick up on right wing styles of discourse
rather than hate speech per se. This could have profound consequences for our understanding of
online political dialogue if the classifiers are applied uncritically to other groups. Nevertheless,
purposive sampling is arguably a necessary step when creating a training dataset given the low
prevalence of abuse on social media in general [107].
3.2.6 Identity of the content creators. The identity of the users who originally created the content in
training datasets is described in only two cases. In both cases the data is synthetic [26, 101]. Chung
et al. use ‘nichesourcing’ to synthetically generate abuse, with experts in tackling hate speech
creating hateful posts. Sprugnoli et al. ask children to adopt pre-defined roles in an experimental
classroom setup, and ask them to engage in a cyberbullying scenario. In most of the non-synthetic
training datasets, some information is given about the sampling criteria used to collect data, such
as hashtags. However, this does not provide direct insight into who the content creators are, such
as their identity, demographics, online behavioural patterns and affiliations.
2Each dataset is weighted equally. In cases where datasets contain multiple categories, we assess the class distribution
based on any tweets which are not non-abusive, for instance combining tweets which are abusive, profane and hateful.
Where different distributions are reported because of different levels of agreement, we take the distribution based on 2/3
agreement, as this is the most widely used across the field.
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Providing more information about content creators may help address biases in existing datasets.
For instance, Wiegand et al. show that 70% of the sexist tweets in the highly cited Waseem and
Hovy dataset [111] come from two content creators and that 99% of the racist tweets come from
just one [112]. This is a serious constraint as it means that user-level metadata is artificially highly
predictive of abuse. And, even when user-level metadata is not explicitly modelled, detection
systems only need to pick up on the linguistic patterns of a few authors to nominally detect abuse.
Overall, the complete lack of information about which users have created the content in most
training datasets is a substantial limitation which may be driving as-yet-unrecognised biases. This
can be remedied through the methodological rigour implicit in including a data statement with a
corpus.
3.3 Annotation of training datasets
3.3.1 Annotation process. How training datasets are annotated is one of the most important aspects
of their creation. A range of annotation processes are used in training datasets, which we split into
five high-level categories:
(1) Crowdsourcing (15 datasets). Crowdsourcing is widely used in NLP research because it is
relatively cheap and easy to implement. The value of crowdsourcing lies in having annotations
undertaken by ‘a large number of non-experts’ ([10], p. 278) – any bit of content can be
annotated by multiple annotators, effectively trading quality for quantity. Studies which
use crowdsourcing with only a few annotators for each bit of content risk minimising
quality without counterbalancing it with greater quantity. Furthermore, testing the work
of many different annotators can be challenging [13, 42] and ensuring they are paid an
ethical amount may make the cost comparable to using trained experts. Crowdsourcing
has also been associated with ‘citizen science’ initiatives to make academic research more
accessible but this may not be fully realised in cases where annotation tasks are laborious
and low-skilled [16, 91].
(2) Academic experts (22 datasets). Expert annotation is time-intensive but is considered to pro-
duce higher quality annotations. Waseem reports that ‘systems trained on expert annotations
outperform systems trained on amateur annotations.’ [109] and, similarly, D’Orazio et al.
claim, ‘although expert coding is costly, it produces quality data.’ [37]. However, the notion
of an ‘expert’ remains somewhat fuzzy within abusive content detection research. In many
cases, publications only report that ‘an expert’ is used, without specifying the nature of their
expertise – even though this can vary substantially. For example, an expert may refer to an
NLP practitioner, an undergraduate student with only modest levels of training, a member
of an attacked social group relevant to the dataset or a researcher with a doctorate in the
study of prejudice. In general, we anticipate that experts in the social scientific study of prej-
udice/abuse would perform better at annotation tasks then NLP experts who may not have
any direct expertise in the conceptual and theoretical issues of abusive content annotation.
In particular, one risk of using NLP practitioners, whether students or professionals, is that
they might ‘game’ training datasets based on what they anticipate is technically feasible for
existing detection systems. For instance, if existing systems perform poorly when presented
with long range dependencies, humour or subtle forms of hate (which are nonetheless usually
discernible to human readers) then NLP experts could unintentionally use this expectation to
inform their annotations and not label such content as hateful.
(3) Professional moderators (3 datasets). Professional moderators offer a standardized approach
to content annotated, implemented by experienced workers. This should, in principle, result
in high quality annotations. However, one concern is that moderators are output-focused
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as their work involves determining whether content should be allowed or removed from
platforms; they may not provide detailed labels about the nature of abuse and may also set
the bar for content labelled ‘abusive’ fairly high, missing out on more nuance and subtle
varieties. In most cases, moderators will annotate for a range of unacceptable content, such
as spam and sexual content, and this must be marked in datasets.
(4) A mix of crowdsourcing and experts (6 datasets).
(5) Synthetic data creation (4 datasets). Synthetic datasets are an interesting option as they are
inherently non-authentic and therefore not necessarily representative of how abuse manifests
in real-world situations. However, if they are created in realistic conditions by experts or
relevant content creators then they can mimic real behaviour and have the added advantage
that they may have broader coverage of different types of abuse. They are also usually easier
to share.
3.3.2 Identity of the annotators. The data statements framework given by Bender and Friedman
emphasises the importance of understanding who has completed annotations. Knowing who the
annotators are is important because ‘their own “social address" influences their experience with
language and thus their perception of what they are annotating.’ [9] In the context of online
abuse, Binns et al. show that the gender of annotators systematically influences what annotations
they provide [11]. No annotator will be well-versed in all of the slang or coded meanings used to
construct abusive language. Indeed, many of these coded meanings are deliberately covert and
obfuscated [7]. To help mitigate these challenges, annotators should be (a) well-qualified and (b)
diverse. A homogeneous group of annotators will be poorly equipped to catch all instances of abuse
in a corpus. Recruiting an intentionally mixed groups of annotators is likely to yield better recall of
abuse and thus a more precise dataset [35].
Information about annotators is unfortunately scarce. In 23 of the training datasets no information
is given about the identity of annotators; in 17 datasets very limited information is given, such as
whether the annotator is a native speaker of the language; and in just 10 cases is detailed information
given. Interestingly, only 4 out of these 10 datasets are in the English language. Relevant information
about annotators can be split into (i) Demographic information and (ii) annotators’ expertise and
experience. In none of the training sets is the full range of annotator information made available,
which includes:
(1) Demographic information. The nature of the task affects what information should be provided,
as well as the geographic and cultural context. For instance, research on Islamophobia should
include, at the very least, information about annotators’ religious affiliation. Relevant variables
include:
(a) Age
(b) Ethnicity and race
(c) Religion
(d) Gender
(e) Sexual Orientation
(2) Expertise and experience. Relevant variables include:
(a) Field of research
(b) Years of experience
(c) Research status (e.g. research assistant or post-doc)
(3) Personal experiences of abuse. In our review, none of the datasets contained systematic
information about whether annotators had been personally targeted by abuse or had viewed
such abuse online, even though this can impact annotators’ perceptions. Relevant variables
include:
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(a) Experiences of being targeted by online abuse.
(b) Experiences of viewing online abuse.
3.3.3 Guidelines for annotation. A key source of variation across datasets is whether annotators
were given detailed guidelines, very minimal guidelines or no guidelines at all. Analysing this issue
is made difficult by the fact that many dataset creators do not share their annotation guidelines.
21 of the datasets we study do not provide the guidelines and 14 only provide them in a highly
summarised form. In just 15 datasets is detailed information given (and these are reported on in
just 9 publications). Requiring researchers to publish annotation guidelines not only helps future
researchers to better understand what datasets contain but also to improve and extend them. This
could be crucial for improving the quality of annotations; as Ross et al. recommend, ‘raters need
more detailed instructions for annotation.’ [90]
The degree of detail given in guidelines is linked to how the notion of ‘abuse’ is understood. Some
dataset creators construct clear and explicit guidelines in an attempt to ensure that annotations
are uniform and align closely with social scientific concepts. In other cases, dataset creators allow
annotators to apply their own perception. For instance, in their Portuguese language dataset,
Fortuna et al. ask annotators to ‘evaluate if according to your opinion, these tweets contain hate
speech’ [43]. The risk here is that authors’ perceptions may differ considerably; Salminen et al. show
that online hate interpretation varies considerably across individuals [93]. This is also reflected in
inter-annotator agreement scores for abusive content, which is often very low, particularly for tasks
which deploy more than just a binary taxonomy. However, it is unlikely that annotators could ever
truly divorce themselves from their own social experience and background to decide on a single
‘objective’ annotation. Abusive content annotation is better understood, epistemologically, as an
intersubjective process in which agreement is constructed, rather than an objective process in which
a ‘true’ annotation is ‘found’. For this reason, some researchers have shifted the question of ‘how can
we achieve the correct annotation?’ to ‘who should decide what the correct annotation is?’ [109].
Ultimately, whether annotators should be allowed greater freedom in making annotations, and
whether this results in higher quality datasets, needs further research and conceptual examination.
Some aspects of abusive language present fundamental issues that are prone to unreliable
annotation, such as Irony, Calumniation and Intent. They are intrinsically difficult to annotate
given a third-person perspective on a piece of text as they involve making a judgement about
indeterminate issues. However, they cannot be ignored given their prevalence in abusive content
and their importance to how abuse is expressed. Thus, although they are fundamentally conceptual
problems, these issues also present practical problems for annotators, and should be addressed
explicitly in coding guidelines. Otherwise, as [31] note, these issues are likely to drive type II errors
in classification, i.e. labelling non-hate-speech utterances as hate speech.
Irony. This covers statements that have a meaning contrary to that one might glean at first
reading. Lachenicht [68] notes that Irony goes against Grice’s quality maxim, and as such Ironic
content requires closer attention from the reader as it is prone to being misinterpreted. Irony is a
particularly difficult issue as in some cases it is primarily intended to provide humour (and thus
might legitimately be considered non-abusive) but in other cases is used as a way of veiling genuine
abuse. Previous research suggests that the problem is widespread. Sanguinetti et al. [94] find irony
in 11% of hateful tweets in Italian. [69] find that irony is one of the most common phenomena in
self-deleted comments; and that the prevalence of irony is 33.9% amongst deleted comments in a
Croatian comment dataset and 18.1% amongst deleted comments in a Slovene comment dataset.
Furthermore, annotating irony (as well as related constructs, such as sarcasm and humour) is
inherently difficult. [75] report that agreement on sarcasm amongst annotators working in English
ACM Forthcoming, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: April 2020.
Directions in Abusive Language Training Data 15
is low, something echoed by annotations of Danish content [34]. Irony is also one of the most
common reasons for content to be re-moderated on appeal, according to Pavlopoulos et al. [83].
Calumniation. This covers false statements, slander, and libel. From the surveyed set, this is
annotated in datasets for Greek [83] and for Croatian and Slovene [69]. Its prevalence varies
considerably across these two datasets and reliable estimations of the prevalence of false statements
are not available. Calumniation is not only an empirical issue, it also raises conceptual problems:
should false information be considered abusive if it slanders or demeans a person? However, if
the information is then found out to be true does it make the content any less abusive? Given
the contentiousness of ‘objectivity’, and the lack of consensus about most issues in a ‘post-truth’
age [103], who should decide what is considered true? And, finally, how do we determine whether
the content creator knows whether something is true? These ontological, epistemological and social
questions are fundamental to the issue of truth and falsity in abusive language. Understandably,
most datasets do not taken any perspective on the truth and falsity of content. This is a practical
solution: given error rates in abusive language detection as well as error rates in fact-checking, a
system which combined both could be inapplicable in practice.
Intent. This information about the utterer’s state of mind is a core part of how many types
of abusive language are defined. Intent is usually used to emphasize the wrongness of abusive
behaviour, such as spreading, inciting, promoting or justifying hatred or violence towards a given
target, or sending a message that aims at dehumanising, delegitimising, hurting or intimidating
them [94]. [68] postulate that “aggravation, invective and rudeness ... may be performed with
varying degrees of intention to hurt", and cite five legal degrees of intent [64]. However, it is
difficult to discern the intent of another speaker in a verbal conversation between humans, and even
more difficult to do so through written and computer-mediated communications [25]. Nevertheless,
intent is particularly important for some categories of abuse such as bullying, maliciousness and
hostility [50, 87]. Most of the guidelines for the datasets we have studied do not contain an explicit
discussion of intent, although there are exceptions. [97] include intent as a core part of their
annotation standard, noting that understanding context (such as by seeing a speakers’ other online
messages) is crucial to achieving quality annotations. However, this proposition poses conceptual
challenges given that people’s intent can shift over time. Deleted comments have been used to
study potential expressions of regret by users and, as such, a change in their intent [23, 69]; this
has also been reported as a common motivator even in self-deletion of non-abusive language [84].
Equally, engaging in a sequence of targeted abusive language is an indicator of aggressive intent,
and appears in several definitions. [39] require an “intent to physically assert power over women"
as a requirement for multiple categories of misogynistic behaviour. [50] find that messages that are
“unapologetically or intentionally offensive" fit in the highest grade of trolling under their schema.
Kenny et al. [64] note how sarcasm, irony, and humour complicate the picture of intent by
introducing considerable difficulties in discerning the true intent of speakers (as discussed above).
Part of the challenge is that many abusive terms, such as slurs and insults, are polysemic and may
be co-opted by an ingroup into terms of entertainment and endearment [50].
4 DATASET SHARING
4.1 The challenges and opportunities of achieving Open Science
All of the training datasets we analyse are publicly accessible and as such can be used by researchers
other than the authors of the original publication. Sharing data is an important aspect of open
science but also poses ethical and legal risks, especially in light of recent regulatory changes,
such as the introduction of GPDR in the UK [28, 116]. This problem is particularly acute with
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abusive content, which can be deeply shocking, and some training datasets from highly cited
publications have not been made publicly available [22, 82, 108]. Open science initiatives can also
raise concerns amongst the public, who may not be comfortable with researchers sharing their
personal data [40, 100].
The difficulty of sharing data in sensitive areas of research is reflected by the Islamist extremism
research website, ‘Jihadology’. It chose to restrict public access in 2019, following efforts by Home
Office counter-terrorism officials to shut it down completely. They were concerned that, whilst it
aimed to support academic research into Islamist extremism, it may have inadvertently enabled
individuals to radicalise by making otherwise banned extremist material available. By working
with partners such as the not-for-profit Tech Against Terrorism, Jihadology created a secure area
in the website, which can only be accessed by approved researchers.3 Some of the training datasets
in our list have similar requirements, and can only be accessed following a registration process.
Open sharing of datasets is not only a question of scientific integrity and a powerful way
of advancing scientific knowledge. It is also, fundamentally, a question of fairness and power.
Opening access to datasets will enable less-well funded researchers and organisations, which
includes researchers in the Global South and those working for not-for-profit organisations, to
steer and contribute to research. This is a particularly pressing issue in a field which is directly
concerned with the experiences of often-marginalised communities and actors [111]. For instance,
one growing concern is the biases encoded in detection systems and the impact this could have
when they are applied in real-world settings [29, 47]. This research could be further advanced by
making more datasets and detection systems more easily available. For instance, Binns et al. use the
detailed metadata in the datasets provided by Wulczyn et al. to investigate how the demographics
of annotators impacts the annotations they make [11, 117]. The value of such insights is only clear
after the dataset has been shared – and, equally, is only possible because of data sharing.
More effective ways of sharing datasets would address the fact that datasets often deteriorate
after they have been published [106]. Several of the most widely used datasets provide only the
annotations and IDs and must be ‘rehydrated’ to collect the content. Both of the datasets provided
by Waseem and Hovy and Founta et al. must be collected in this way [45, 111], and both have
degraded considerably since they were first released as the tweets are no longer available on Twitter.
Chung et al. also estimate that within 12 months the recently released dataset for counterspeech by
Mathew et al. had lost more than 60% of its content [26, 73]. Dataset degradation poses three main
risks: First, if less data is available then there is a greater likelihood of overfitting. Second, the class
distributions usually change as proportionally more of the abusive content is taken down than the
non-abusive. Third, it is also likely that the more overt forms of abuse are taken down, rather than
the covert instances, thereby changing the qualitative nature of the dataset.
4.2 Research infrastructure: Solutions for sharing training datasets
The problem of data access and sharing remains unresolved in the field of abusive content detection,
much like other areas of computational research [5]. At present, an ethical, secure and easy way of
sharing sensitive tools and resources has not been developed and adopted in the field. More effective
dataset sharing would (1) greater collaboration amongst researchers, (2) enhance the reproducibility
of research by encouraging greater scrutiny [54, 77, 80] and (3) substantively advance the field by
enabling future researchers to better understand the biases and limitations of existing research and
to identify new research directions.
There are two main challenges which must be overcome to ensure that training datasets can be
shared and used by future researchers. First, dataset quality: the size, class distribution and quality
3See: https://www.ft.com/content/55338012-5ae0-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a
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of their content must be maintained. Second, dataset access: access to datasets must be controlled
so that researchers can use them, whilst respecting platforms’ Terms of Service and not allowing
potential extremists from having access. These problems are closely entwined and the solutions
available, which follow, have implications for both of them.
(1) Synthetic datasets. Four of the datasets we have reviewed were developed synthetically. This
resolves the dataset quality problem but introduces additional biases and limitations because
the data is not real. Synthetic datasets still need to be shared in such a way as to limit access
for potential extremists but face no challenges from Platforms’ Terms of Services.
(2) Data ‘philanthropy’ or ‘donations’. These are defined as ‘the act of an individual actively
consenting to donate their personal data for research’ [100]. Donated data from many individ-
uals could then be combined and shared – but it would still need to be annotated. A further
challenge is that many individuals who share abusive content may be unwilling to ‘donate’
their data as this is commonly associated with prosocial motivations, creating severe class
imbalances [100]. Data donations could also open new moral and ethical issues; individuals’
privacy could be impacted if data is re-analysed to derive new unexpected insights [104].
Informed consent is difficult given that the exact nature of analyses may not be known in
advance. Finally, data donations alone do not solve how access can be responsibly protected
and how platforms’ Terms of Service can be met. For these reasons, data donations are
unlikely to be a key part of future research infrastructure for abusive content detection.
(3) Platform-backed sharing. Platforms could share datasets and support researchers’ access.
There are no working examples of this in abusive content detection research, but it has been
successfully used in other research areas. For instance, Twitter has made a large dataset of
accounts linked to potential information operations, known as the “IRA" dataset (Internet
Research Agency).4 This would require considerably more interfaces between academia and
industry, which may be difficult given the challenges associated with existing initiatives, such
as Social Science One. However, in the long term, we propose that this is the most effective
solution for the problem of sharing training datasets. Not only because it removes Terms
of Service limitations but also because platforms have large volumes of original content
which has been annotated in a detailed way. This could take one of two forms: platforms
either make content which has violated their Community Guidelines available directly or
they provide special access post-hoc to datasets which researchers have collected publicly
through their API - thereby making sure that datasets do not degrade over time.
(4) Data trusts. Data trusts have been described as a way of sharing data ‘in a fair, safe and
equitable way’ ( [53] p. 46). However, there is considerable disagreement as to what they
entail and how they would operate in practice [33]. The Open Data Institute identifies that
data trusts aim to make data open and accessible by providing a framework for storing and
accessing data, terms and mechanisms for resolving disputes and, in some cases, contracts to
enforce them.5 For abusive content training datasets, this would provide a way of enabling
datasets to be shared, although it would require considerable institutional, legal and financial
commitments.
Arguably, the easiest way of ensuring data can be shared is to maintain a very simple data
trust, such as a database, which would contain all available abusive content training datasets.
This repository would need to be permissioned and access controlled to address concerns relating
to privacy and ethics. Such a repository could substantially reduce the burden on researchers;
4See https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2018/enabling-further-research-of-information-operations-on-
twitter.html
5See https://theodi.org/article/what-is-a-data-trust/
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once they have been approved to the repository, they could access all datasets publicly available –
different levels of permission could be implemented for different datasets, depending on commercial
or research sensitivity. Furthermore, this repository could contain all of the metadata reported
with datasets and such information could be included at the point of deposit, based on the ‘data
statements’ work of Bender and Friedman [9]. A simple API could be developed for depositing and
reading data, similar to that of the HateBase.6 The permissioning system could be maintained either
through a single institution or, to avoid power concentrating amongst a small group of researchers,
through a decentralised blockchain.
4.3 A new repository of training datasets: Hatespeechdata.com
The resources and infrastructure to create a dedicated data trust and API for sharing abusive content
training datasets is substantial and requires considerable further engagement with research teams
in this field. In the interim, to encourage greater sharing of datasets, we have launched a dedicated
website which contains all of the datasets analysed here: https://hatespeechdata.com. Based
on the analysis in the previous sections, we have also provided partial data statements [9]. The
website also contains previously published abusive keyword dictionaries, which are not analysed
here but some researchers may find useful. Note that the website only contains information/data
which the original authors have already made publicly available elsewhere. It will be updated with
new datasets in the future.
5 BEST PRACTICES FOR TRAINING DATASET CREATION
Much can be learned from existing efforts to create abusive language datasets. We identify best
practices which emerge at four distinct points in the process of creating a training dataset: (1) task
formation, (2) data selection, (3) annotation, and (4) documentation.
5.1 Task formation: Defining the task addressed by the dataset
Dataset creation should be ‘problem driven’ [58] and should address a well-defined and specific
task, with a clear motivation. This will directly inform the taxonomy design, which should be
well-specified and engage with social scientific theory as needed. Defining a clear task which the
dataset addresses is especially important given the maturation of the field, ongoing terminological
disagreement and the complexity of online abuse. The diversity of phenomena that fits under the
umbrella of abusive language means that ‘general purpose’ datasets are unlikely to advance the
field. New datasets are most valuable when they address a new target, generator, phenomenon, or
domain. Creating datasets which repeat existing work is not nearly as valuable.
5.2 Selecting data for abusive language annotation
Once the task is established, dataset creators should select what language will be annotated, where
data will be sampled from and how sampling will be completed. Any data selection exercise is
bound to give bias, and so it is important to record what decisions are made (and why) in this step.
Dataset builders should have a specific target size in mind and also have an idea of the minimum
amount of data this is likely to be needed for the task. This is also where steps 1 and 2 intersect:
the data selection should be driven by the problem that is addressed rather than what is easy to
collect. Ensuring there are enough positive examples of abuse will always be challenging as the
prevalence of abuse is so low. However, given that purposive sampling inevitably introduces biases,
creators should explore a range of options before determining the best one – and consider using
multiple sampling methods at once, such as including data from different times, different locations,
6See https://hatebase.org/how_it_works
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different types of users and different platforms. Other options include using measures of linguistic
diversity to maximize the variety of text included in datasets, or including words that cluster close
to known abusive terms.
5.3 Annotating abusive language
Annotators must be hired, trained and given appropriate guidelines. Annotators work best with
solid guidelines, that are easy to grasp and have clear examples [85]. The best examples are both
illustrative, in order to capture the concepts (such as ‘threatening language’) and provide insight
into ‘edge cases’, which is content that only just crosses the line into abuse. Decisions should be
made about how to handle intrinsically difficult aspects of abuse, such as irony, calumniation and
intent (see above). Annotation guidelines should be developed iteratively by dataset creators; by
working through the data, rules can be established for difficult or counter-intuitive coding decisions,
and a set of shared practices developed. Annotators should be included in this iterative process.
Discussions with annotators the language that they have seen “in the field" offers an opportunity to
enhance and refine guidelines - and even taxonomies. Such discussions will lead to more consistent
data and provide a knowledge base to draw on for future work. To achieve this, it is important
to adopt an open culture where annotators are comfortable providing open feedback and also
describing their uncertainties. Annotators should also be given emotional and practical support (as
well as appropriate financial compensation), and the harmful and potentially triggering effects of
annotating online abuse should be recognised at all times. For a set of guidelines to help protect
the well-being of annotators, see [106].
5.4 Documenting methods, data, and annotators
The best training datasets provide as much information as possible and are well-documented. When
the method behind them is unclear, they are hard to evaluate, use and build on. Providing as much
information as possible can open new and unanticipated analyses and gives more agency to future
researchers who use the dataset to create classifiers. For instance, if all annotators’ codings are
provided (rather than just the ‘final’ decision) then a more nuanced and aware classifier could be
developed as, in some cases, it can be better to maximise recall of annotations rather than maximise
agreement [35].
Our review found that most datasets have poor methodological descriptions and few (if any)
provide enough information to construct an adequate data statement. It is crucial that dataset
creators are up front about their biases and limitations: every dataset is biased, and this is only
problematic when the biases are unknown. One strategy for doing this is to maintain a document
of decisions made when designing and creating the dataset and to then use it to describe to readers
the rationale behind decisions. Details about the end-to-end dataset creation process are welcomed.
For instance, if the task is crowdsourced then a screenshot of the micro-task presented to workers
should be included, and the top-level parameters should be described (e.g. number of workers,
maximum number of tasks per worker, number of annotations per piece of text) [91]. If a dedicated
interface is used for the annotation, this should also be described and screenshotted as the interface
design can influence the annotations.
5.5 Best practice summary
Unfortunately, as with any burgeoning field, there is confusion and overlap around many of the
phenomena discussed in this paper; coupled with the high degree of variation in the quality of
method descriptions, it has lead to many pieces of research that are hard to combine, compare, or
re-use. Our reflections on best practices are driven by this review and the difficulties of creating
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high quality training datasets. For future researchers, we summarise our recommendations in the
following seven points:
(1) Bear in mind the purpose of the dataset; design the dataset to help address questions and
problems from previous research.
(2) Avoid using ‘easy to access’ data, and instead explore new sources which may have greater
diversity. Consider what biases may be created by your sampling method.
(3) Determine size based on data sparsity and having enough positive classes rather than ‘what
is possible’.
(4) Establish a clear taxonomy to be used for the task, with meaningful and theoretically sound
categories.
(5) Provide annotators with guidelines; develop them iteratively and publish them with your
dataset. Consider using trained annotators given the complexities of abusive content.
(6) Involve people who have direct experience of the abuse which you are studying whenever
possible (and provided that you can protect their well-being).
(7) Report on every step of the research through a Data Statement.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper examined a large set of datasets for the creation of abusive content detection systems,
providing insight into what they contain, how they are annotated, and how tasks have been framed.
Based on an evidence-driven review, we provided an extended discussion of how to make training
datasets more readily available and useful, including the challenges and opportunities of open
science as well as the need for more research infrastructure. We reported on the development of
hatespeechdata.com – a new repository for online abusive content training datasets. Finally, we
outlined best practices for creation of training datasets for detection of online abuse. We have
effectively met the four research aims elaborated at the start of the paper.
Training detection systems for online abuse is a substantial challenge with real social conse-
quences. If we want the systems we develop to be useable, scalable and with few biases then we
need to train them on the right data: garbage in will only lead to garbage out.
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Language Entries % abusive Source Task Granularity Annotators Ref.
Arabic 1100 59% Twitter Profanity Hierarchy Crowdsourced [78]
Arabic 15050 39% YouTube Ambiguous Binary Experts, academic [1]
Arabic 32000 81% AlJazeera Profanity Hierarchy Crowdsourced [78]
Arabic 5846 38% Twitter Mixed Hierarchy Experts, academic [79]
Arabic 6136 45% Twitter Group Binary Crowdsourced [2]
Croatian 17000000 2% 24sata website Flagged Binary Experts, professional [69]
Danish 3600 12% Facebook, Reddit Mixed Multi-topic/class Expers, academic [99]
English 100000 NA Wikipedia Personal Hierarchy Crowdsourced [117]
English 115737 12% Wikipedia Personal Binary Crowdsourced [117]
English 1288 100% Facebook* Group Mixture Synthetic [26]
English 13000 40% Twitter Group Mixture Mix [8]
English 14100 33% Twitter Mixed Mixture Mix [119]
English 1528 28% Fox News Group Binary Experts, academic [46]
English 160000 NA Wikipedia Ambiguous Hierarchy Crowdsourced [117]
English 16914 32% Twitter Group Multi-topic/class Experts, academic [111]
English 16975 1% World of Warcraft Personal Binary Experts, academic [18]
English 17354 1% League of Legends Personal Binary Experts, academic [18]
English 22324 24% Reddit Group Binary Crowdsourced [86]
English 24189 13% Twitter Mixed Multi-topic/class Experts, academic [87]
English 24802 6% Twitter Group Binary Crowdsourced [30]
English 33776 43% Gab Group Binary Crowdsourced [86]
English 35000 16% Twitter Personal Binary Crowdsourced [50]
English 3977 47% Twitter Group Mixture Crowdsourced [39]
English 4033 16% Twitter Group Multi-topic/class Mix [109]
English 712 100% Twitter Group Hierarchy Experts, academic [62]
English 80000 18% Twitter Mixed Multi-topic/class Crowdsourced [45]
English 9916 11% Stormfront Group Hierarchy Experts, academic [31]
French 1719 100% Facebook* Group Mixture Synthetic [26]
German 469 NA Twitter Group Binary Experts, academic [90]
German 5836 11% Facebook Group Hierarchy Experts, academic [19]
German 8541 34% Twitter Mixed Mixture Experts, academic [113]
Greek 1450000 34% Gazetta Flagged Binary Experts, professional [83]
Greek 1500 22% Gazetta Flagged Binary Experts, academic [83]
Hindi-English 18000 6% Facebook Group Mixture Experts, academic [67]
Hindi-English 21000 27% Twitter Group Mixture Experts, academic [67]
Hindi-English 3189 65% Twitter Group Hierarchy Experts, academic [74]
Hindi-English 4575 36% Twitter Group Binary Experts, academic [14]
Indonesian 13169 42% Twitter Mixed Multi-topic/class Crowdsourced [60]
Indonesian 2016 54% Twitter Ambiguous Hierarchy Crowdsourced [59]
Indonesian 713 36% Twitter Group Binary Experts, academic [3]
Italian 1071 100% Facebook* Group Mixture Synthetic [26]
Italian 14600 8% Whatsapp* Personal Binary Synthetic [101]
Italian 1827 13% Twitter Group Mixture Mix [94]
Italian 4000 32% Twitter Group Mixture Mix [17]
Italian 4000 51% Facebook Group Mixture Experts, academic [17]
Portugese 1250 33% g1.globo.com Group Mixture Experts, academic [32]
Portugese 3059 32% Twitter Group Multi-topic/class Experts, academic [43]
Slovene 7600000 8% MMC RTV website Flagged Binary Experts, professional [69]
Spanish 11000 32% Twitter Group Binary Experts, academic [4]
Spanish 4138 50% Twitter Group Mixture Crowdsourced [39]
Spanish 6600 40% Twitter Group Mixture Mix [8]
Table 1. Datasets surveyed. Synthetic data use indicated with asterisk.
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